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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal fl'.om the pl'.opel'.ty distl'.ibution and 
attol'.ney's fee pal'.ts of a final Judgment entel'.ed by the Thi!'.d 
Distl'.ict Coul'.t of Salt Lake County, Utah, in a divol'.ce action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Judqment sought to be l'.evel'.sed was entel'.ed on 
Mal'.ch 14, 19A3. On Ap!'.il 7, 1983, the tl'.ial coul'.t denied Plain-
tiff's Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment made 
pul'.suant to Rules 52(b) and 59(a)(6) and (7), and (e), U.R.C.P., 
thus l'.einstatinq the ol'.iginal judqment. 
NATURE OF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant l'.equests this Coul'.t to eithel'. (1) make find-
inqs of its own and awal'.d he!'. an additional $22,400.00 fl'.om the 
distl'.ibutive shal'.e of the mal'.ital assets l'.emaining at the time of 
tl'.ial awal'.ded to Respondent as and fol'. l'.eimbul'.sement of appl'.oxi-
mately one-half the value of the Fleetway business inventol'.ies 
dissipated bv him dul'.inq the pendency of the action in violation 
of the Coul'.t's injunction, toqethe!'. with an incl'.eased awal'.d of 
counsel fees and costs, Ol'. (2) l'.emand the matte!'. to the tl'.ial 
crnirt with instl'.uctions to amend its Judgment in that mannel'.. 
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STATEMENT 0F THE FACTS 
The facts material •n thP issur:c Dn appeal arr> ac; 
follows: 
The parties separated on September 6, 1979, after 18 
years of marriage (Record on Appeal [hereinafter "R."] 416-17). 
On that date, their marital estate consisted of a residence, an 
automobile, a pickup truck and camper, horses and related tack and 
trailers, life insurance policy cash values, a qun collection and 
miscellaneous camping equipment, furniture, 1ewelrv and other 
items personal to each, and the assets of two Utah business corpo-
rations, Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway Tire, Inc. ("Fleetway") 
( R. 4 2 2). 
( R.1A). 
The divorce action was commenced on September 17, 1979 
When the parties separated, Gill's Tire Market was 
defunct (R.420). Before the end of 1979, Respondent, as a direc-
tor and its managinq officer and without Appellant's participa-
tion, commenced a U. S. Rankruptcy Court Chapter 11 proceeding 
involving that corporation (R.186-87, 420-21). That proceeding 
was still pending at the time of trial in December 1982 (R.187). 
Respondent had taken an investor-partner, Candland, into 
his Fleetway business in September 1978 (Exhibit P-1; R.187). 
They became deadlocked in business affairs and Candland commenced 
a dissolution action in 1979 (R.195). That suit was settled bv 
arbitration in about August 1979, pursuant to which Resronclent 
became sole owner of the Fleetwav business and and 
Candland received cash from a joint business account (R.195, 198, 
24 7). The final settlement sum paid to Candland was based, in 
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part, upon each party's suggestion to the arbitrator of the value 
,1f the Fleetway inventories which influenced that settlement sum 
1nllar-for-dollar (R.250-51). By a list in his own handwriting, 
Respondent identified those inventory items and claimed their 
value to be $51,237; Candland made corrections to that list and 
asserted a value of $57,500 (Exhibit P-3; R.197). After conclu-
sion of the arbitration Respondent was in sole control of the 
Fleetway assets (R.200, 278) which included the inventory items 
listed on Exhibit P-3 (R.197-98). 
The same week that the parties separated Respondent was 
forced to completely shut down Fleetway operations as a result of 
an execution sale by its landlord (Exhibit P-7; R.278-79). 
Respondent was able to secure removal of Fleetway's equipment and 
inventories (R.278-79) which he stored at various locations in 
Salt Lake County includinq the premises of a business operated by 
his sister, Bea Lund, and the warehouse of a friend, Peck (R.205, 
296, 185-86). Fleetway did not resume business, and its corporate 
income tax return reporting the 1979 final year's operations dis-
closed balance sheet closing inventories valued at $47, 554 and 
depreciable equipment with a basis of approximately $13,300 
( E:xhibit P-25). 
Although Appellant was a nominal officer of Fleetway, 
she had no control over manaqement decisions or day-to-day conduct 
of the business (R.420). She had not been involved in the 
Pleetway business deal with Candland (R.421). 
The month following Fleetway's closing, on October 29, 
1979, a restraining order was entered against Respondent pursuant 
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to an order to show cause and stipulation bv which he was enjoined 
pendent lite from encumbering nr d1sposinq •Jf any marital propPr-
ties--and specifically Gill's Tire '1arket and FlPPtway businP'i 
assets--without Appellant's express prior knowlc>clqe ancl approval 
or without obtaining a court order upon application and notice 
(R.8, 18-22). 
In December 1979, Appellant obtainecl an order bifurca-
ting the divorce issue from the other issuPS joined in the action, 
in part, for the reason that the Gi 11 's Ti re Market bankruptcy 
proceeding would necessarily delay resolution of the economic 
issues (R.30-31). A Decree of Divorce was granted to Appellant on 
January 22, 1980 (R.40-41). 
In October 1980, and without notifying Appellant or 
obtaining her approval or a court order, Respondent used the 
Fleetway equipment and remaining inventories to open a tire sales 
and service sole-proprietorship business in Salt Lake County under 
the name "Tire 11 (R.205, 210, 365-69). He operated that 
business for two years, sel 1 inq its assets two months prior tn 
trial for $15,000 (R.205-6). The buyer allocated $12,000 of that 
price to the value of equipment which was almost equal to its 
basis reported in the final Fleetway tax return; the balance of 
the purchase price was for inventory (Exhibit P-5; R.3'l4). The 
purchasers' $5,000 down-payment was paid to Resoondent's sister, 
Bea Lund, who saw to its application in satisfaction of Tire City 
obligations; the $10,000 contract balance was found to be sub1ect 
to prior claims of Mrs. Lund and Mr. Peck for obligations that d1d 
not involve Appellant (Findings of Fact, Para. XVII; R.161). The 
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,-o,1r• found that "The businesses [including Fleetway and Tire 
C1•'_1] have not prospered and there have not been any increase in 
assets of the parties used bv the defendant to operate the 
trns1nesses Gr maintain himself," (Findings of Fact, Para. XI; R. 
ltiO), and that "If anv additional monies remain [from the Tire 
r1tv $10 ,000 contract balance after 
claims], it is the joint property of 
(Findings of Fact, Para. XVII; R. 161). 
the payment of the prior 
plaintiff and defendant." 
(Emphasis added) 
Appellant's initial discovery was served in December 
1979; the first interrogatory concerned the identification, loca-
tion and valuation of the parties' business assets, particularly 
Fleet way IR. 23-24 I. Respondent's attitude toward the discovery 
crocess, and his willingness to comply therewith, was reflected by 
f-\1.; answer to that first 
!Jf IR. 4 6 I . That 
interrogatory: 
answer was not 
"None, with the exception 
filed unt i 1 seven months 
dftor- service of the interrogatory and onlv after a motion to 
compe 1 IR. 4 2) . Thereafter Respondent pursued a course of delay, 
ohfuscation and non-compliance with Appellant's attempts to trace 
the marital assets under his control, all of which is shown by the 
motion to compel deposition discovery, September 1980, 
and compulsion order-, November 1980 (R.56, 59, 66-67); deposition 
rlocument r-equests, December 1980, motion to compel document-
prnduction and continued deposition discovery, January 1981, and 
se>,:ond compulsion order, March 1981 (R.75, 82); motion and order 
in supplemental proceedings, May 19A1, and order to show cause for 
fnl,JCe to appear, July 1982 (R.93-94, 98-99); unanswered request 
f,_,, supolementation of discovery responses, July 1982 (R.101); 
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failure to appear for deposi'=i•)n rliscover·; oursuant tn not:ire, 
November 1982 (R.115); and a moti•rn f._ir s.rn,'ri,)n·;, November lgR: 
( R. 118-19). 
Not until a rleposition three weeks prinr to 
after Appellant sought Rule 37 sanctions aoainst him--did Pesoon-
dent produce the first of the documents anrl records related to the 
Fleetway assets and the Tire City business, as he had been orrlered 
to do nineteen months earlier (R.82). Those documents were criti-
cal to Appellant's case and had first been requested in detailed, 
itemized discovery in December 1980 (R. 70-71) ! His disclosure of 
those records continued piecemeal after that deposition to the 
second day of trial; even then, ancl notw1thstancling service of a 
subpoena duces tecum, all the documents were not produced (R.219-
223, 347). His explanation for not producing sales books and 
receipts for Tire City was, "I miqht could qet: some. d icln' t: 
think they were relevant. ( R. 225). 
A certified public accountant called bv Apoellant as an 
expert witness testified that Tire City experiencecl a cash loss of 
$37 ,000 in two years. His computation of that loss took inro 
account the Ti re City sale price and unreoorted cash used bv 
Respondent to purchase used tires for resale (R.474). 'T'he expert 
testified that such a loss could onlv be acrnunted for hy clebts or 
infusions of business capital either in the form of cash or assets 
converted to cash (R.458). Flecause Respondent hacl furnished n•l 
information to the contrarv and all husiness rlPbts had heer, 
accounted for, the expert qave his opinion that he oresum<>d the 
losses were financed by cash from conv"'rrerl assets rP.4'J0-6n, 
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WhPn asked hy his counsel to explain the losses, Respondent 
,,.,,as 1JnablP to du s0 stat inq, don't understand it" 
"· ', 7 01. Respondent admitt<>d that hP had used an additional $300 
: or 'TlOnt'l cash from t'1e ti 11 for personal use which was not 
The expert had 
that anv such cash paid-outs would increase the 
-,rerat1ng loss (R.455). Accordingl1, Respondent's total use of 
IJ:lPXOlainerl cash during the period he operated Tire City 
the 
the 
appr0ximaterl 
,-J, ' 1 1 a r - v a 1 'J e 
$44,200 
of the 
ftr1al 
which was 
Fleet way 
tax 
roughly equivalent to 
inventories reoorted on 
($47,554), less the ending 
1oventorv at the time of sale ($2,722) (Exhibits P-25 and P-19). 
Respondent's acc0unting for his disposition of the 
Fleetway closing invPntories was contradictory and incomplete. 
Y1s test1m0ny was: that wheels, tires and shock absorbers valued 
"'- S6,100 which he harl transferred to his sister, Bea Lund, in 
of a debt constituted the sole Fleetway inventories inves-
·"J tn Tire C1tv (Exhibit P-19; R.211, 215); that approximately 
s1=,nnn-Sl4,000 worth of Fleetwav's recap tire inventory had been 
desrr,)yed hy Peck and him in August 1979 pursuant to an order by 
'.he 11. s. Deoartment of Transportation (R.289, 404); that some of 
inventory items, " . under $10,000 worth," had been used to 
ra·/ Fleetway debts (R.3621; and that some had been sold to 
'!ec,cwav C'Jst·)mers (R.276!. Later testimony and exhibits showed: 
-,,,,,1,,n,4Pnt' s sister admitted no ownership interest in the Tire 
1•v hus1ness (R.292, 299-301) and testified that the transfer to 
r,.,r ,,f 1nventorv valued at S6, 100 had been a form of security for 
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the prior debt which she had surrenderPd by relPasing that inven-
tory to her brother for his use in the TirP Citv business 
(R.309-10 ) ; Respondent's original copy of th" qrwernment 01ir1:ha:;o 
order for the sample recap ti res inspected f0r safety c0mpl iancp 
pre-dated by two years his purchase fr0m Candland of the r<'cao 
tires he claimed to have destroyed, and affidavits of the dirPctor 
of the U.S. Department of Transportation office charged with 
enforcement of the safety regulations by Respondent to be 
the reason he had to destrov the recaps established that the tires 
purchased from Respondent's businesses met safetv standards and 
that no enforcement action was necessary and that none had been 
taken (Exhibits P-21, P-22, P-23; R.272-74, "l4 8' 3 51); and, 
despite Appellant's repeated requests, Respondent failed to pro-
duce any documents whatever verifying the amounts or dates of 
sales to Fleetway customers or the claimed inventory trade-outs in 
payment of Fleetway obligations (R.276, 362). Except for these 
explanations, Respondent admitted that all the Fleetway inven-
tories ended up at his Tire City business 
The record is clear that at all times after entry of the 
Court's restraining order Respondent dealt with the Fleetway joint 
properties while Appellant attempted via discoverv to identify, 
locate and value them. She did not approve his using them and he 
obtained no court order authorizina him to do so. Against this 
evidentiary background, the Court ann0unced that lt could not find 
"that Mr. Gill, the defendant, intccntionally secreted or hid 
assets to deprive the plaintiff" ( R. 61 8) . 
Respondent voluntarilv accounted t () Appellant for his 
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3a]P 0f certain horses by giving her half of the proceeds which 
ccie use>d, primarily, to pay marital obligations (Exhibits P-26, 
n-10; R.267-70). However, he apparently used $1,000 from the sale 
-if a h0rse for his business (R.286-87). The total of his contri-
hutinns t0 her support during the three-year period between their 
sPparation and the time of trial was $852.72 paid with Tire City 
checks and a pair of snow tires (Exhibit D-9). Respondent refused 
tn make anv mortgage payments on their home which was being occu-
by Appellant, and except for four months' arrearages paid out 
-if the horse-sale money given to her (R.427-28), Appellant made 
al 1 mortgage payments and paid sums demanded by judgment-lien 
creditors to forestall execution on that residence with her $768 
monthly net income and money provided by her son (R.433-34). That 
nume constitutes the parties' principal remaining marital asset. 
Following entrv of the divorce decree, Appellant's coun-
s services in the case were directed primarily toward reconci-
ling the parties' property rights as they related to Respondent's 
use ,,f t'ie F'leetway assets (R.552). Counsel's fees for services 
rendered to the conclusion of trial for which llopellant asserted 
claim for contribution by Respondent were $9,683 (R.546). The 
,_,)urt, however, discounted entirely the fees and costs Appellant 
had incurred in presenting her claims at trial after the laborious 
ond time-consuming preparation necessitated by Respondent's ac-
ions. She was awarded only Sl,553.25 
311'/ attributed to the leoal services 
attorney's fees, specifi-
rendered to the date of 
Pntrv of the divorce decree, January 22, 1980, together with costs 
'' that date (R.558-59). 
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ARGl'MF'NT 
POINT 
THE COURT F'RREfJ IN LAW BY PEFllS!NG T() AWARD 
APPELLANT A LARGER Sl1ARI=: OF THF: RF'MAINI'lG MARITAL 
ASSETS TO COMPENSATE HFR FOR RFSPONfJENT'S VIOLATION 
OF THE COURT'S INJUNCTION AND RFSTRAINI'lG ORDF:R. 
A. THE COURT'S Fl'lDI'lG OF AN ABSF'NCF OF' 
INTENT IS IMMATERIAL TO APPELLANT'S RIGHT 0F 
RECOVERY. 
Appellant requested the Court to grant her recovery for 
one-half the value of the Pleetway assets dissipated by Respondent 
in violation of its restrainino order. Findinq that Respondent 
had not ". intentionally secreted or hid assets to deprive the 
plaintiff" ( R. 618), the Court denied Appellant recovery and 
ordered a distribution of the last remaininq marital assets in a 
manner it apparently viewed as creatinq an approximate equivalence 
between the parties. 
Temporary restraining orders and injunctions serve the 
purpose of maintaininq the status quo between lit iciants and ore-
venting future acts which would otherwise in1ure a oartv. 42 
Am Jur 2d, "Injunctions," and 4, op. 727-7 31. Al rernate rerne-
dies are available upon violation of an in1unction including 
citing the violator for contempt, sub1ect ino the violator to the 
penalty provided in the Court's order or cornpellinq him to refund 
monies obtained by his act of disobedi<"nce. at o. 1145. 
Utah law recoqnizes the accepted distinction between two 
classes of contempt proceed in gs: civil and crimincil. When an 
injured party requesting relief also seeks to vindicate the power 
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an,1 d1qnity of the Court via imposition of a fine or imprisonment 
'o"n the violat0r which is punitive in purpose, the proceedings 
HP cr1m1nal in character; however, when the proceedings brought 
thP in"jured party are for the purpose of seeking compensation 
,r damaqes for losses sustained as a result of violation of the 
Cnurt' s lawful order, thev are classified as civil. Davidson v. 
Munsey, 29 Utah 181, RO P. 743 (1905). It is held that proof of 
1nrent is not required in a civil contempt proceeding in order for 
the 1nJured party to obtain relief. 
The absence of wilfulness does not relieve 
from civil contempt. Civil as distinquished from 
criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compli-
ance with an order of the court or to compensate 
for losses or damages sustained by reason of non-
compliance. [Citations omitted.] Since the 
purpose is remedial, it matters not with what 
intent the defendant did the prohibited act. 
McComb v. ,Tacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 
1 9 1 , 6 9 S. Ct . 4 9 7, 4 9 9, 9 3 L. F::d. 9 9 ( 1 9 4 9) • 
The Utah case of Gunnison Irriqation Co. v. Peterson, 74 
:_1t3h 460, 280 P. 715 (1929), is in accord. In Gunnison, an adju-
d1cat1on of defendant's contempt was reversed for reasons related 
r') interpretation of the water rights decree in question and the 
adPquacy of the lower court's findings. we are not told 
whPther a fine or imprisonment had been imposed upon defendant, 
3nd the case does not discuss the distinction between civil and 
criminal contempt proceedings, this Court stated: 
The entire question to be determined in this 
proceeding is whether the defendant in fact took or 
diverted water decreed to plaintiff as alleged in 
the affidavit, without plaintiff's consent and to 
its injury. The pleadinqs and proofs suggest that 
the defendant hel ieved he had a right to take the 
water. But that cannot be a defense to the charge. 
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It has frequently been said by thP courts that qood 
faith, ignorance of law, or ac't tnc:i upon the advice 
of counsel, is not a defense. In Rorlgers v. Pitt 
(C.C.) 89 F'. 424, 429, rhe court usei'l the following 
language: 
"The rlefenc1ant in this case was bound to 
obey the injunction, anrl, when he interfered 
with the court's order, he was acting at his 
peril. He certainly ought not to have acted 
upon his own judgment as to what his rights 
were, when it was manifest that his acts 
would, at least, amount to a technical viola-
tion of the terms of the injunction. It was 
not for him to set up his own opinion as to 
the meaning and effect of the injunction. If 
he entertained any doubt as to what he might 
do without violating the injunction, he should 
have applied to the court for a modification 
of the injunction, or for the privilege of 
doing certain acts which, by the advice of 
counsel, he claims he had the right to do." 
[Citation omitted] 
Each of these parties undoubtedly acted at his 
peril when he proceeded to use the waters so adju-
dicated in the face of the restraining orders 
issued If either took water belonging to 
the other against his will, whether in good faith, 
under a misapprehension of the terms of the decree, 
or under mistake of law, such party thereby came 
into contempt of the court. 
74 Utah at 466. 
In the Rodgers v. Pitt case cited in Gunnison, above, 
the Court went on to state: 
The belief, motive, or intent of the defendant 
not to violate the inJunction does not excuse him 
if in fact his acts resulted in a violation of it. 
The breach of the injunction consists in doing the 
forbidden thing, and not in the intention with 
which it is done. 
89 F. 424 at 429. 
Gunnison also cited Weston v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 
73 S.E. 799 (1912), in which the Court said: 
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The motive for violating the order is not con-
sidered in passing upon the question of contempt, 
and the respondent cannot purge himself by a dis-
avowal of any wrong intent. It is the fact of his 
obedience that alone will be considered. [Cita-
tions omitted] 
In deciding whether there has been an actual 
breach of an injunction, it is important to consi-
der the objects for which relief was granted, as 
well as the circumstances attending it; and it is 
to be observed that the violation of the spirit of 
an order or writ, even though its strict letter may 
not have been disregarded, is a breach of the man-
date of the court. 
73 S.E at 800. 
Appellant has not overlooked this Court's contempt 
cases, such as Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977), in 
which it is stated that the offending party must be shown to have 
willfully and knowingly failed to obey the Court's order. Those 
cases are distinguishable, however, as being contempt proceedings 
of a criminal nature. 
Courts of general jurisdiction possess the inherent 
power to punish for contempt, In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217 
I 1913), just as they have the inherent power to enforce their law-
ful injunctive orders upon the request of a party. It is recog-
nized that the violator of an injunction or restraining order may 
be compelled to respond in damages at the request of the injured 
party whether or not a contempt citation is sought. Hanna v. 
Martin, 49 So.2d 585 (Florida 1950); Theis v. Federal Finance Co., 
.!.2£., 480 P.2d 244 (Washington 1971); and Griggs v. Doctor, 61 
'LW. 761 (Wisconsin 1895). Appellant did not seek to have Respon-
dent adjudged in contempt of court. 
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If Respondent's intent would r1avr0 heen immat0r1al in J 
civil contempt proceeding in wh1cr1 sh"' souqht damaqes, S'1rPl 
right to recover when seek i nq ,-,impensat ton t<ir ci 'J to lat u1n 1Jf , ',c 
Court's injunctive order purposed f 1:)r her pr-,-,tPct t••n should not ;,0 
barred by a finding of absence of intent. The lower court f,:iunrl 
that Respondent had used joint Fleetway assets in the T1 re City 
business to maintain himself and that any remaining Tire City con-
tract proceeds would be their joint property (Findings of Fact, 
Para. XI and XVII). Because the Court made no findings in jus>: 1 -
fication or excuse of Respondent's violation of its inJunct1on, 
its ruling against Appellant was necessarily based upon its "no 
intent" finding and, as such, was legally erroneous. 
B. APPELLANT'S PROOF WAS SUFFICIENT UNDER 
THE LAW TO SUSTAIN THE RECOVERY SHE SOUGHT. 
In Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144 (19461, 
the right to recover damages in a contempt proceeding f,•r 
party's failure to deliver certain bonds in v10lat10n of a tem-
porary restraining order and final decree was acknowledged. 
In a contempt proceeding such as this the 
damages suffered by the party aqgr1eved are for all 
practical purp0ses measured in the same manner as 
the damages in the case wher>'> the party proceeded 
against is being sued for his failure to perform an 
obligation undertaken voluntarily. [Citations 
omitted] 
Any actual loss suff.,red by the 
aggrieved may be recovered if caused by the 
through his contemptuous acts. Davidson v. 
and cases cited above. 
party 
oarty 
Munsey 
From Sutherland Damage:", 4th Ed., 1916, S>'>c. 
75, pp. 272, 273, we quote: 
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"Each party to a contract has a legal 
right to performance by the other according to 
its legal import and effect. Any default is a 
violation of that right. The injured party is 
entitled to a measure of compensation which 
will place him in as good condition as if the 
contract had been fulfilled. * * *" 
111 Utah at 82-83. 
This Court has often stated that damages need not be 
proved precisely, but that the injured party must only demonstrate 
an amount with enough certainty to enable the factfinder to assess 
an award. "Where there is strong evidence of the fact of damage, 
a defendant should not escape liability because the amount of 
damage cannot be proved with precision." Winsness v. M. J. Conoco 
Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979). Citing Professor 
rorbin, Winsness states: 
. There is little that can be regarded as 
'certain,' especially with respect to what would 
have happened if the march of events had been other 
than it in fact has been. Neither court nor jury 
is required to attain 'certainty' in awarding 
damages; and this is just as true with respect to 
'value' as with respect to 'Profits.' Therefore, 
the term 'speculative and uncertain profits' is not 
really a classification of profits, but is instead 
a characterization of the evidence that is intro-
duced to prove that they would have been made if 
the defendant had not committed a breach of con-
tract. The law requires that this evidence shall 
not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no 
reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages 
to be determined by sympathy and feelings alone. 
The amount of evidence required and the degree of 
its strength as a basis of inference varies with 
circumstances. A greater amount and a higher 
degree are required in those cases in which it is 
usually possible to produce it than in cases where 
it is usually impossible or difficult and the 
defendant had reason to know it. 
593 P.2d at 1306. 
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Appellant's evidence established the value of the 
Fleetway inventories as $51,237 at the time of Respondent's 
buy-out from his par-tner- (Exhibit P-3), and as $47,554 at the 
cessation of business that same year-, 1979 (Exhibit P-25). 
Respondent admitted that the Fleetway inventor-ies eventually found 
their way to his Tire City business (R.366-69). The logical and 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence of Respondent's 
use of over $44, 200 unexplained cash during the two years he 
operated Tire City is that during that period he liquidated the 
total Fleetway inventories which had been in his custody continu-
ously after he closed down Fleetway operations. He did so in a 
clandestine manner without keeping records of those sales and 
without disclosing his dealings to Appellant until he was forced 
by court process to do so. As a result, the marital estate was 
dissipated for Respondent's own purposes without Appellant's 
approval. Even if Respondent gained no profit fr-om his actions 
and the Ti re City business did not "prosper," as the Court found 
(Findings of Fact, Para. XI; R. 160), that does not excuse his 
violation of the injunction. Southwestern Loan & Finance Corp. v. 
Arkansas Transportation Co., 45 S.W.2d 501 (Arkansas 1932). He 
certainly benefited, however, by regularly taking money from the 
till and by making payments to his sister- with business checks on 
a pre-existing debt that did not involve Appellant (Exhibit D-9). 
In order to place Appellant in as good condition as if 
the injunction had not been violated, Foreman, supra, and the 
mar-ital assets had been divided at the time the divor-ce decr-ee was 
granted in January 1980, she should be awarded a sum equivalent to 
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<)nP-half the value of those joint assets dissipated thereafter, or 
$22,400. Proof of that damage figure is certain 
<'n"llgh in this highly equitable case, especially where the evi-
rlence was almost exclusively under Respondent's control and was so 
difficult to obtain. 
C. THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS IN JUSTI-
FICATION OF RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF ITS 
INJUNCTION. 
The Court made no finding in excuse or justification of 
Respondent's violation of its injunction. The burden of proving 
any such defense was upon Respondent. Thomas, supra. Respondent 
signed the stipulation and joined in the motion upon which the 
Court's restraining order was based (R.18-19). He knew what was 
required of him under the injunction and the Court made no finding 
of his inability to comply. Foreman, supra. 
The Court's use of the non-intent language in its 
findings to negative the ordinary understanding that the words 
"hi<le" and "secret" necessarily imply a design or purpose seems 
onl'! to support Appellant's suggestion that its sole basis for 
denying her relief was erroneous in law. The marital Fleetway 
assets were, in fact, used by Respondent in the Tire City business 
(Findings of Fact, Para. XI) and the sale-contract vestiges of 
those assets were recognized by the Court to be joint property 
(Pindinqs of Fact, Para. XVII). Appellant has no argument with 
the Court's finding that the Tire City sales proceeds were subject 
to the claims of Lund and Peck as those claims clearly arose prior 
to the October 1979 restraining order: Lund, 1977 (R.305) and 
Peck, August 1979 (Exhibit D-11). However, the Court did not 
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find that Appellant had prior knowledqe and approvecl of Respon-
dent's use of the Fleet way assets, and if >_he record otherwise 
would support a finding that a portion of the Pleetway inventories 
was disposed of prior to the effective date of >he restraining 
order, the Court failed either to make such a finding or to hold 
Respondent accountable for the portion of the total inventories 
that was dissipated in violation of the injunction. Opt ions were 
available to him: He could have applied to the Court for modifi-
cation of the injunction or authorization to use the Fleetway 
assets in his new business, or he could have made a full disclo-
sure to Appellant and obtained her approval. He cl id neither. 
Instead, he chose to flaunt the Court's order and frustrate Appel-
lant's attempts to gain information about the joint properties. 
Respondent did, in fact, violate the letter and spirit of the 
injunction. In doinq so, he acted at his peril. 
POINT I I 
THE COURT'S FINDING OF ABSENCE OF' l'lTENT IS 
AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Assuming that the element of intent was essential to 
Appellant's right to recover, she submits that the record and evi-
dence clearly preponderate against the Court's no-intent finding. 
It cannot be gainsaid that the course of conduct under-
taken by Respondent vis-a-vis Appellant's timely, detailed and 
continuing pursuit of discovery which was directed soecifically 
and primarily to the Fleetway and Tire \itv assets clearly evi-
denced a design and purpose to withhold information from her at 
all costs and for as lonq as possible. 
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Respondent's intent to further his unilateral 
dissipation of those joint properties was also evidenced by his 
story of the government-ordered destruction of Fleetway 
recaps and his undocumented claims of sales and trade-outs of 
FlPetway assets which would necessarily have been accounted for in 
the corporation's final tax return ending inventory, dated 
December 1980. In addition, Respondent's sister, Bea Lund, denied 
ownership of the inventories Respondent claimed to have 
••transferred" to her. No other explanations of his disposition of 
those inventory assets was proffered. Appellant suggests this 
discovery conduct and the evidence contradicting Respondent's 
testimony, all as established in the record, clearly preponderates 
against the Court's finding that Respondent did not intend to 
violate its injunctive order. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD APPELLANT THE 
RELU:F SHE SOUGHT CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION. 
Appellant submits that the Court's denial of her request 
for relief under the circumstances of this case results in such a 
serious inequity that a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial judge is manifested. 
She did not ask the Court to punish Respondent; anv such 
request would only have evidenced fruitless spite and vindictive-
nf?SS. Appel lant sought only redress for actual losses in an 
1ttempt to reconstruct her life. As a consequence of the Court's 
arirrobation of Resoondent' s conduct, Appellant will suffer 
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irreparable impediment to her ability to make her life as produc-
tive and as happy as it otherwise miqht have been. 
While a trial court's adJustment of partiPs' prooertv 
interests is entitled to a presumption of valirlity, this Court 
should jealously quard the application of its announcer'! principals 
of equity by the courts which are subject to its power of review. 
The result of the trial court's rul inq in this case deprives 
Appellant of a fair share of the financial resources anrl benefits 
accumulated during the marriage. If the parties' properties had 
been divided at the time the divorce was granted in January 1980, 
Appellant unquestionably would have been entitled to one-half of 
the value of the Fleetway assets. She asked for nothing more at 
the later trial. To fail to compel Respondent's accounting for 
his disposition of those assets and reinstate Appellant to a posi-
tion of parity as it would have existed when the restraininq order 
was entered is inequitable. These circumstances cry for this 
Court's intervention. The lower court's ru 1 i nq should not be 
countenanced or permitted to stand. 
POINT II/ 
THE COURT'S DPNIAL OF AN AWARD FOR ATTORNP,Y'S 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED RY APPELLANT APTER THE DATP, 
OF THE DIVORCE DECREE WAS AN ARUSE OF DISCRETION. 
This Court has uphelrl attorney's fee awards 
plaintiff-wives of $8,000 where 514,920 were the total fees 
incurred, Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2rl 149 (Utah 1978), and $15,000 
where counsel expended s 19' 1 00 time on his client's case, 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, P. 2d (Utah No. 18516 filed August 5, 
198 3) • 
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In Gramme no abuse of discretion was found as a result 
•f the fractional award of fees because 
Plaintiff was compelled to enqage in extensive 
discovery, particularly in reqard to the assets and 
defendant's ownership thereof, which in several 
instances he claimed were owned by others. 
587 P. 2d at 149. 
In Yelderrnan the award was approved as not being an 
abuse of discretion under the circumstances that the defendant had 
r<>fused to make rnortgaqe Payments, the plaintiff had found it 
nec<>ssary to obtain a restraining order against him from selling 
any more marital properties and that it was " apparent that 
some portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees were incurred because 
of d<>f<>ndant's own actions." 
From the record in this case it is clear that the prin-
cipal part of the time expended by Appellant's counsel after entry 
of the decree was referrabl<> to the identification, tracing and 
valuation of the Fleetway assets under Respondent's control. 
Resoondent's deliberate frustration of the discovery Process, his 
delav in producing the documents and other information properly 
re-iuested by Appellant and his blatant refusal to comply with 
val id discovery compulsion ou:lers until the eleventh hour all 
militate toward this Court concluding that an award of only 
Sl,553.00 attorney's fees is an abuse of discretion. Especially 
ts this so when the trial court awarded them expressly on the 
bac;is of time spent to the date of the decree in the bifurcated 
action. Appellant's extensive efforts after that date were made 
in pursuit of legitirnat<> objectives, in good faith and were corn-
PQlled by Respondent's actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
By her claim at trial Appellant sought no more than 
to which she would have been <"ntitled had the Courl 
the parties' marital assets at the time she was granted the 
divorce: one-half the value of all those assets, including the 
ending Fleetway inventories. This Court can restore to her the 
approximate $22,400 loss she has sustained bv awarding her that 
amount out of the share of the marital properties which existed at 
the time of trial awarded to Respondent such as life insurance 
cash values and any proceeds of the sale of their residence. He 
dissipated in excess of twice that amount for his own purposes and 
in violation of the lower court's in1unctive order; he should be 
compelled to respond to Appellant for that injurious conduct. 
Anything less than such an accounting and award would be a clear 
signal to litigants by this Court that injunctions and restrainina 
orders intended to protect parties in disadvantaged positions can 
be violated with impunity. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4-- day of September, 
198 3. 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIRBS & CAHOON 
l 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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hereby declare that caused to be mailed two ( 2) 
true and correct copies of the foreqoinq Brief of Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Lenore M. Gill, postage prepaid, this --¥i- dav of 
September, 1983, to: 
Dwight L. King, Esq. 
King & Peterson ,/ 
2121 South State 
"''" CHy, I 
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